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ESSAY
RACE, SPEECH, AND SPORTS
Matthew J. Parlow *
INTRODUCTION
Race, sports, and free speech rights intersected in a very controversial and public way during the 2016 and 2017 National Football
League (“NFL”) seasons. On August 26, 2016, Colin Kaepernick
spurred a national debate when he refused to stand during the
playing of the national anthem before the NFL preseason game between the Green Bay Packers and the San Francisco 49ers,
Kaepernick’s team at the time. 1 After the game, Kaepernick explained the reason for his protest:
I am not going to stand up to show pride in a flag for a country that
oppresses Black people and people of color. . . . To me, this is bigger
than football and it would be selfish on my part to look the other way.
There are bodies in the street and people getting paid leave and getting away with murder. 2

Kaepernick’s protest, which continued throughout the 2016 NFL
season, was motivated by the killing of African Americans by police
officers—an issue that directly contributed to the recent rise of the
Black Lives Matter movement. 3 Other NFL players also began to

* Dean and Donald P. Kennedy Chair in Law, Chapman University, Dale E. Fowler
School of Law.
1. See Kofie Yeboah, A Timeline of Events Since Colin Kaepernick’s National Anthem
Protest, UNDEFEATED (Sept. 6, 2016), http://theundefeated.com/features/a-timeline-of-even
ts-since-colin-kaepernicks-national-anthem-protest/.
2. Mike Florio, NFL: Players Are Encouraged but Not Required to Stand for National
Anthem, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (Aug. 27, 2016, 1:50 PM EST), http://profootballtalk.nbcspo
rts.com/2016/08/27/nfl-players-are-encouraged-but-not-required-to-stand-for-national-anth
em/.
3. See John Branch, The Awakening of Colin Kaepernick, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017),
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kneel in protest. 4 Still other players showed their support for
Kaepernick’s cause by interlocking arms, placing their hands on
kneeling players’ shoulders (while standing themselves), or raising
their fists. 5 Unsurprisingly, this “take-a-knee” controversy—and
other related forms of protest—became a topic of national conversation during the 2016 NFL regular season. 6
Although Kaepernick was an unsigned free agent the following
season—and thus not playing for any team—symbolic acts by players seeking to raise awareness of social injustice continued in the
early 2017 season. 7 The controversy then exploded during the third
week of the 2017 NFL season when President Donald Trump
waded into the NFL players’ protests, urging fans to leave the football stadiums if players kneeled during the national anthem. 8 At a
political rally, President Trump asked the crowd: “Wouldn’t . . . you
love to see one of these NFL owners, when somebody disrespects
our flag, say: ‘Get that son of a b[itch] off the field right now. Out.
He’s fired!’” 9 The NFL players responded forcefully, with more
than 200 players sitting, kneeling, or raising their fists during the
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/sports/colin-kaepernick-nfl-protests.html. To demonstrate his commitment to reversing this problem, Kaepernick pledged to give $100,000 per
month for ten months—a total of $1 million—to organizations that help ethnic minority and
other underprivileged communities. See Marissa Payne, NFL Players’ Union Names Colin
Kaepernick Its Week 1 MVP for His Charity Work, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/09/15/nfl-players-union-names-colin-kaeper
nick-its-week-1-mvp-for-his-charity-work/. The 49ers also pledged $1 million to two San
Francisco Bay area community groups to work to improve racial and economic inequality.
Dan Loumena, 49ers to Donate $1 Million to Charities That Focus on Racial Issues Cited by
Colin Kaepernick, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016, 6:40 AM), http://www.latimes.com/sports/nfl/
la-sp-colin-kaepernick-49ers-donation-20160908-snap-story.html.
4. Arian Foster, Marcus Peters Among NFL Players Protesting During National Anthem, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED: SI WIRE (Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.si.com/nfl/2016/09/11/na
tional-anthem-protest-kneel-sit-players-list.
5. See Mark Sandritter, A Timeline of Colin Kaepernick’s National Anthem Protest and
the Athletes Who Joined Him, SB NATION (Sept. 25, 2017, 10:28 AM EDT), https://www.
sbnation.com/2016/9/11/12869726/colin-kaepernick-national-anthem-protest-seahawks-bra
ndon-marshall-nfl; Adam Stites, Seahawks Players Link Arms During National Anthem Instead of Kneeling, SB NATION (Sept. 11, 2016, 4:04 PM EDT), https://www.sbnation.com/20
16 /9/11/12851174/seahawks-players-national-anthem-protest-link-arms-kneeling.
6. See Megan Garber, They Took a Knee, ATLANTIC (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.the
atlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/09/why-the-nfl-is-protesting/540927/.
7. See Mark Maske, Colin Kaepernick Files Grievance Accusing NFL Teams of Colluding Against Him, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sport
s/wp/2017/10/15/colin-kaepernick-makes-plans-to-pursue-collusion-case-against-nfl-owner
s/.
8. See Michael McCann, Can an NFL Owner Legally ‘Fire’ a Player for Protesting?,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 23, 2017), https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/09/23/donald-trump-fir
ed-roger-goodell-player-protest.
9. Id.
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national anthem that week. 10 Several players and coaches criticized President Trump’s comments. 11 Many NFL teams also issued
statements in response to President Trump’s remarks. 12 President
Trump and his surrogates responded, and the controversy consumed the news, politics, and the general public’s conversation for
months thereafter.
The public discourse around these events quickly devolved into
platitudes around free speech, political protest, firing players, patriotism, and the like: Were the players exercising their free speech
rights? Could NFL owners fire players for not standing during the
national anthem? Simple answers were given, but they were oftentimes not grounded in the laws, rules, and regulations governing
NFL players and the league as a whole (and, indeed, other professional sports leagues and their players as well).
What was missing from this public debate was the legal context
within which these issues should be analyzed. This disconnection
led to misperceptions regarding what leagues, teams, and players
could and could not do in these circumstances. It also led to oversimplifications that failed to recognize how different sports leagues
might have varying abilities to control—or at least address—players’ behavior related to the national anthem and political protest.
At the same time, this controversy also unearthed—or at least
brought back to public consciousness—a long-standing, simmering
issue for players: the persistent racial dynamic in sports of an increasingly African American group of players feeling controlled by
a group of almost exclusively white, billionaire team owners. 13
This essay seeks to bring greater clarity to this raging political
debate. In particular, it endeavors to construct the legal framework
within which the actions and inactions of professional sports

10. Arnie Stapleton, More Than 200 NFL Players Sit or Kneel During National Anthem,
CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 25, 2017, 10:17 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/football/ct-nflnational-anthem-kneeling-20170924-story.html.
11. NFL Players Who Protested During the National Anthem in Week 3, ESPN: NFL
NATION (Sept. 24, 2017), http://www.espn.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/249755/nfl-playerswho-protested-during-the-national-anthem-in-week-3.
12. Brendan Marks, Here Are All NFL Statements Issued After Comments by President
Trump on Anthem Protests, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Sept. 24, 2017, 1:49 PM), http://www.
charlotteobserver.com/sports/nfl/carolina-panthers/article175144901.html.
13. See Karen Grigsby Bates, When It Comes to Race and Sports, Who Owns an Athlete’s
Opinions?, NPR: CODE SWITCH (Oct. 21, 2017, 6:04 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/
codeswitch/2017/10/21/557692016/when-it-comes-to-race-and-sports-who-owns-an-athletes
-opinions.
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leagues, teams, and players can be analyzed. This essay also aims
to situate this controversy in the complex racial dynamics between
black players and white team owners in sports. Part I provides a
brief history of how sports and political controversy have intersected. Part II explores the various areas of law that apply to
leagues, teams, and their players. Part III describes various professional sports leagues’ internal rules related to the national anthem and free speech rights. Part IV provides examples of leagues
exercising their rights to address player behavior inconsistent with
established league rules. Part V explores the racial dynamics in
sports that spurred player protests related to racial and socio-economic inequality in society.
I. SPORTS AND POLITICAL PROTEST
In some ways, the take-a-knee controversy in the NFL should
not come as a surprise. Athletes have long used their platform in
sports to raise awareness about social issues and to express political protest. One of the most vivid examples of political protest in
sports was when Tommie Smith and John Carlos raised their fists
in the air on the medal stand at the 1968 Olympics in Mexico
City. 14 After winning medals in the 200-meter race, Smith and Carlos split a pair of black gloves and raised their fists in the air during
the playing of the “Star-Spangled Banner” to protest the treatment
of African Americans in the United States. 15 More recently, professional athletes have used media attention around sports to make
various social commentaries. For example, in 2004, Carlos Delgado
of the Toronto Blue Jays in Major League Baseball (“MLB”) chose
not to come out on the field during the playing of “God Bless America” to protest the war in Iraq. 16 In 2010, players on the Phoenix
Suns of the National Basketball Association (“NBA”) wore “Los
Suns” jerseys to show support for immigrants in light of Arizona’s
strict immigration laws and policies. 17 In 2012, members of the
NBA’s Miami Heat wore hoodie sweatshirts to raise awareness
14. See Michael Zink, Sports: A Big-Time Player in the Political Arena, 1 DEPAUL J.
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207, 209 (2003).
15. Id.; Mike Wise, Clenched Fists, Helping Hand, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2006), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/04/AR2006100401753.html.
16. See Mark Kreidler, Delgado’s Protest No Longer Unnoticed, ESPN (July 23, 2004),
http://www.espn.com/mlb/columns/story?columnist=kreidler_mark&id=1845388.
17. Kat Chow, A Brief History of Racial Protests in Sports, NPR: CODE SWITCH (Dec. 2,
2014, 2:16 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/12/02/367766230/a-briefhistory-of-racial-protest-in-sports.
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about Trayvon Martin’s death. 18 Finally, shortly after Eric Garner
died as a result of a New York City police officer putting him in a
chokehold, a number of players in the NBA wore “I Can’t Breathe”
t-shirts during warm-ups. 19
Many athlete protests have also involved the national anthem.
To better explain the phenomenon, it is helpful to understand the
history of the national anthem’s incorporation into sporting events.
The national anthem was first played at a sporting event at the
opening baseball game at the Union Grounds Park in Brooklyn,
New York, on May 15, 1862. 20 While the national anthem was
played occasionally thereafter—including during the 1918 World
Series in the midst of World War I—it was not until World War II
that it became a regular part of MLB games. 21 The NFL has played
the national anthem during its games for several decades. 22 Today,
at most professional sporting events, the national anthem is played
before the game or match begins. 23
When the national anthem is played at such sporting events,
federal statutory law states that people in attendance “should face
the flag and stand at attention with their right hand over the
heart.” 24 It is this tradition that people have used at various points
to protest. For example, during the Vietnam War, some fans chose
to remain seated during the playing of the national anthem to protest the war. 25 In 1996, NBA player Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf refused
to stand during the national anthem, citing his Muslim faith as

18. Id.
19. Ira Boudway, “I Can’t Breathe” and the Not-So Protected Speech of Professional Athletes, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 2014, 4:48 PM EST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2014-12-12/nba-nfl-and-mlb-dont-always-enforce-rules-restricting-players-speech.
20. Louis Jacobson, A Short History of the National Anthem, Protest and the NFL,
POLITIFACT (Sept. 25, 2017, 5:08 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2017
/sep/25/short-history-national-anthem-and-sports/.
21. See id.
22. Id. While NFL players were not required to stand on the sidelines for the “StarSpangled Banner” until 2009, the national anthem was played at games well before then.
See AJ Willingham, The National Anthem in Sports (Spoiler: It Wasn’t Always This Way),
CNN (Sept. 25, 2017, 5:02 PM ET), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/25/us/nfl-national-anthemtrump-kaepernick-history-trnd/index.html.
23. See Willingham, supra note 22.
24. 36 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (emphasis added). Uniformed military personnel in attendance should, instead, stand and salute for the entire song. See id.
25. See Jacobson, supra note 20.
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precluding him from participating in such “nationalistic ritualism.” 26 Abdul-Rauf was also protesting racial oppression and discrimination in the United States 27—similar to Colin Kaepernick
and other NFL players two decades later. While these are just a
smattering of examples, one can get a sense of the history of athletes and political protest.
II. THE LAW GOVERNING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES,
TEAMS, AND PLAYERS
During the public debate regarding the take-a-knee controversy,
it was common to hear people defend the players as exercising their
First Amendment rights. However, this argument is misplaced because the First Amendment does not apply to the NFL, including
its teams and players. The First Amendment applies only to state
action, 28 and because the NFL is a private association, the First
Amendment does not apply to the private employer-employee relationship between NFL teams and their respective players.
Instead, the ability for professional sports leagues and their
teams to control or address players’ speech and acts of protest derive from the various governing documents of the leagues: the
league constitution, collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”),
standard player contract, and league rules. The CBA, standard
player contract, and some league rules are negotiated through the
collective bargaining process. In this regard, as one scholar notes,
“the CBA is the ‘supreme governing authority’ concerning employment” between professional athletes and their leagues and
teams. 29
26. See Kelly B. Koenig, Note, Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf’s Suspension for Refusing to
Stand for the National Anthem: A “Free Throw” for the NBA and Denver Nuggets, or a “Slam
Dunk” Violation of Abdul-Rauf’s Title VII Rights?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 377, 377–78 (1998)
(quoting Player to Stand for Anthem, NBA Lifts His Suspension, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Mar. 15,
1966, at B2).
27. See id. at 378 n.6.
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; id. amend. XIV; Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 349 (1974) (“In 1883, this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, affirmed the essential dichotomy set forth in [the Fourteenth Amendment] between deprivation by the State, subject
to scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct, ‘however discriminatory or wrongful,’
against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield.” (citations omitted) (quoting
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948))).
29. Michael A. Mahone, Jr., Note, Sentencing Guidelines for the Court of Public Opinion: An Analysis of the National Football League’s Revised Personal Conduct Policy, 11
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 181, 192 (2008) (quoting Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team
Sports, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 167, 168–69 (1995)).
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Consistent with the National Labor Relations Act, professional
sports leagues—made up of team owners—and their respective
players’ unions negotiate, among other things, the terms and conditions of employment for players. 30 These include matters like
compensation (“wages”), regular season obligations and off-season
workouts (“hours”), rules governing endorsements, player wardrobe, and public statements and other forms of player expression
(“other conditions of employment”). 31 Other mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining are disciplinary measures and grievance procedures. 32 Once the league and the players’ union agree to these
various terms related to player employment, the rules and conditions become more or less sacrosanct under the law. Specifically,
the conditions of employment are exempt from antitrust laws. 33
Some of the rules and policies governing player actions would otherwise be considered a restraint on trade and thus violate antitrust
laws. 34 However, because the terms of the CBA are agreed to by
both the team owners and the players’ union, they receive this insulation from antitrust laws. 35 In this regard, players must abide
by employment conditions that would otherwise violate existing
laws.
Additionally, the CBA’s special legal status precludes the league
from unilaterally changing these terms or imposing new terms

30. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012); see also Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 180
N.L.R.B. 190 (1969) (establishing the National Labor Relations Board’s jurisdiction over
professional sports leagues).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (“[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees . . . with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . .”); see Cody McElroy, Take a Knee:
Speech Considerations in the NFL, CIVILIAN (Oct. 5, 2016), https://sites.law.lsu.edu/civil
ian/2016/10/take-a-knee-speech-considerations-in-the-nfl.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (including “the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder” as a subject of collective bargaining); NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S.
342, 344 (1958) (establishing 29 U.S.C. §158(d) as defining the scope of “mandatory collective bargaining”); see Stiglitz, supra note 29, at 168–69 (describing the typical CBA between
a sports league and a players’ union, which contains sections devoted to discipline and the
grievance procedure). If either the league or the players’ union refuses to negotiate on a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, it will constitute an unfair labor practice and
thus violate the duty to collectively bargain. Brent D. Showalter, Technical Foul: David
Stern’s Excessive Use of Rule-Making Authority, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 205, 218 (2007).
In addition, both sides must negotiate in good faith through bona fide, arms-length negotiations. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 238–39 (1996).
33. See Sean W.L. Alford, Dusting Off the AK-47: An Examination of NFL Players’ Most
Powerful Weapon in an Antitrust Lawsuit Against the NFL, 88 N.C. L. REV. 212, 223 (2009).
34. See John C. Weistart, Player Discipline in Professional Sports: The Antitrust Issues,
18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 703, 705–06 (1977).
35. See Alford, supra note 33, at 223.
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without going through the collective bargaining process with the
players’ union. 36 In this regard, a professional sports league’s CBA
prescribes the ability for the league and its teams to regulate and
punish athlete behavior, while also setting limits and protections
for players based on the agreed-upon terms.
III. LEAGUE RULES ON THE NATIONAL ANTHEM AND PLAYER
SPEECH
A. NFL Rules as an Example of League Regulation of Players’
Speech
The NFL and other professional sports leagues have various
rules that regulate player speech, expression, and actions—both
related and unrelated to the national anthem. These types of rules
start with policies aimed at addressing player conduct on and off
the field or court. For example, in paragraph two of the NFL standard player contract, the player agrees to “conduct himself on and
off the field with appropriate recognition of the fact that the success of professional football depends largely on public respect for
and approval of those associated with the game.” 37 Paragraph
eleven of the NFL standard player contract provides even stronger
protection for a team by allowing the team to terminate a player’s
contract if the player’s “conduct [is] reasonably judged by [the
team] to adversely affect or reflect on [the team].” 38 The NFL CBA,
in article 46, also gives the NFL Commissioner the power to discipline a player “for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public
confidence in, the game of professional football.” 39 These provisions
allow a team or the commissioner to discipline—up to and including firing—a player for conduct detrimental to the team, league, or
sport.

36. See Stiglitz, supra note 29, at 173. A professional sports league can, however, unilaterally change terms that are not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. See Colin
J. Daniels & Aaron Brooks, From the Black Sox to the Sky Box: The Evolution and Mechanics
of Commissioner Authority, 10 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 23, 32 (2008) (citing 29 U.S.C. §
158(d)).
37. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE & NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS’N, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT 256 (2011) [hereinafter NFL CBA], https://nfllabor.files.wordp
ress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf; McCann, supra note 8.
38. NFL CBA, supra note 37, at 260; McCann, supra note 8.
39. NFL CBA, supra note 37, at 204; McCann, supra note 8.
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The NFL also seeks to limit player speech and expression in a
variety of ways. For example, the NFL rules state that “[t]hroughout the period on game-day that a player is visible to the stadium
and television audience . . . players are prohibited from wearing,
displaying, or otherwise conveying personal messages either in
writing or illustration” unless the league approves it in advance. 40
The NFL makes clear that it will not grant permission for player
expression related to political activities or causes. 41 Moreover, the
NFL forbids players from wearing or otherwise promoting the commercial names or company logos within ninety minutes after a
game without permission from the league. 42 The NFL also seeks to
stem player public criticism of the referees, the league, a team, or
other players. 43
To be sure, not all such NFL policies are geared toward restricting player speech and expression. The NFL CBA states that the
National Football League Players Association—the players’ union—“will use its best efforts to ensure that players cooperate with
the [teams] and the news media (including television, radio, internet, print) in reasonable promotional activities on behalf of the
[teams] and the NFL.” 44 Moreover, the NFL’s Media Access Policy
requires star players to speak to the media after a game and during
practices that week. 45 These provisions demonstrate the importance that the NFL places on media access and players’ participation in media interviews. In these regards, the NFL seeks to
limit player speech and expression on a variety of fronts while also

40. Nicolas Chavez, Kaepernick Rolling Out of the Constitutional Pocket: NFL’s Restriction of Players’ First Amendment Rights, U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. (Sept. 19,
2016), https://race-and-social-justice-review.law.miami.edu/kaepernick-rolling-constitution
al-pocket-nfls-restriction-players-amendment-rights/ (quoting NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE,
2016 OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 23 (2016), https://oper
ations.nfl.com/media/2224/2016-nfl-rulebook.pdf [hereinafter 2016 NFL PLAYING RULES]).
41. See McElroy, supra note 31 (citing 2016 NFL PLAYING RULES, supra note 40, at 23).
42. Boudway, supra note 19 (citing NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 2014 OFFICIAL PLAYING
RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 23–24 (2014), https://operations.nfl.com/im
ages/content/rules/2014rulebook.pdf). Many professional sports leagues regulate what players can wear before, during, and after games, and players that violate these policies can be
subject to league or team discipline. Id.
43. Steve Silver, No Free Speech (or Silence) in the NFL, LEGAL BLITZ (Nov. 26, 2014),
http://thelegalblitz.com/blog/2014/11/26/no-free-speech-or-silence-in-the-nfl/ (quoting NFL
CBA, supra note 37, at 216).
44. Id. (quoting NFL CBA, supra note 37, at 216).
45. See McElroy, supra note 31 (citing NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 2015 MEDIA ACCESS
POLICY 3 (2015), https://operations.nfl.com/media/1788/2015-nfl-media-access-policy.pdf).
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ensuring that players communicate with the media during the season.
B. NFL Policies Related to the National Anthem
The NFL’s rules and restrictions on player speech and expression intermittently come into the public consciousness as isolated
issues arise. However, nothing drew the public’s attention like the
take-a-knee controversy. Some of the misperceptions that pervaded the public discourse on this issue may have stemmed from
the lack of uniformity among professional sports leagues regarding
expected player conduct during the playing of the national anthem.
With regard to the NFL, the lack of a detailed policy furthered misunderstandings about what the league required or could require of
its players. The NFL CBA is silent on the league’s expectations of
players regarding the national anthem. 46 Moreover, the 2017 Official Playing Rules of the National Football League do not provide
a national anthem policy either. 47
The NFL game operations manual, on the other hand, reportedly
requires that the national anthem be played before the start of
every NFL game. 48 The policy allegedly states that players must
be on the sidelines during the playing of the national anthem and
that they “should stand at attention, face the flag, hold helmets in
their left hand, and refrain from talking.” 49 The policy even allegedly notes that players failing to do so may face discipline from the
league, including fines or suspensions. 50 However, as the NFL clarified publicly during the height of the take-a-knee controversy,
“players are strongly encouraged, but not required, to stand during
the national anthem.” 51 This clarification may have been made because the NFL game operation manual may not be collectively bargained (and thus cannot be enforced against the players) or because the word “should” is used, which is suggestive but not

46. See id.
47. See Willingham, supra note 22.
48. See Jacobson, supra note 20 (noting that the “game operations manual” is not publicly available for review online).
49. Id.
50. Alex Fitzpatrick, Does the NFL Require Players to Stand for the National Anthem?,
TIME (Sept. 25, 2017), http://time.com/4955704/nfl-league-rulebook-a62-63-national-anthe
m-rule/.
51. Jacobson, supra note 20 (quoting NFL spokesperson Brian McCarthy).
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mandatory. In any event, the NFL’s governing documents and various policies make clear that the league cannot require players to
stand during the national anthem.
C. Other Professional Sports Leagues’ National Anthem Policies
Major League Soccer, the National Hockey League, and MLB—
like the NFL—do not have policies requiring their players to stand
for the national anthem, though they do require that the national
anthem be played before their respective games. 52 Unlike these
other professional sports leagues, the NBA has a clear policy that
requires players—and coaches and trainers—to line up and stand
during the playing of the national anthem. 53 This long-standing
rule has been part of the NBA game operation policies for decades. 54 During the take-a-knee controversy and before the start of
the 2017–2018 season, NBA Commissioner Adam Silver pointed to
the rule when stating publicly that the league expected players to
stand for the national anthem. 55 Moreover, the NBA sent a detailed
memorandum to its teams reminding them of the rule and encouraging various ways in which teams and their players could build
stronger and safer communities. 56 Nevertheless, while it is clear
that the national anthem has a strong and storied tie to professional sports, most leagues do not require their players to stand for
the playing of the national anthem.
IV. EXAMPLE OF LEAGUES REGULATING PLAYER SPEECH
Professional sports leagues have exercised their rights under
their respective CBAs and governing documents to regulate the
speech and expression of their players. One of the most well-known
52. See Kevin Seifert, How National Anthem Rules Differ Across Sports Leagues, ESPN
(Sept. 29, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/20848575/rules-national-anthem-differsports-leagues.
53. Tim Cato, The NBA Actually Has a Rule Against Kneeling for the National Anthem,
SB NATION (Sept. 29, 2017, 9:33 PM EDT), https://www.sbnation.com/2017/9/25/16358070/
national-anthem-protest-kneel-kneel-rule (citing NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N, OFFICIAL RULES
OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, 2016-2017, at 61 (2016), https://ak-staticint.nba.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/11/2016-2017-Rule-Book.pdf).
54. Tim Bontemps, NBA Memo Reinforces National Anthem Rule and Encourages Community Engagement, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/sports/wp/2017/09/29/nba-memo-makes-clear-players-and-coaches-must-stand-for-nationa
l-anthem/.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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examples involved former MLB player John Rocker. Expressing
his dislike for New York baseball fans, Rocker made racist, homophobic, and other insensitive remarks to a reporter. 57 In response,
MLB Commissioner Bud Selig suspended Rocker from spring
training and regular season games through the first month of the
season, mandated that Rocker pay $20,000 to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People or a similar organization that promoted diversity, and required Rocker to complete a
diversity training program. 58 The Major League Baseball Players
Association—the players’ union—filed a grievance on behalf of
Rocker challenging the punishment. 59 While the arbitrator reduced Rocker’s punishment—finding it disproportionate given past
precedent—he validated Commissioner Selig’s authority to discipline Rocker for his comments that were not in the best interest of
baseball. 60
Another high-profile example of league discipline of player expression and speech was when former NBA player Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf chose not to stand during the playing of the national anthem during the 1994–1995 NBA season. 61 In response to
reporters’ questions about his decision, Abdul-Rauf stated that he
chose not to stand because of his Muslim faith and his opposition
to racial oppression. 62 The NBA sought to find a resolution to the
controversy by offering Abdul-Rauf the option of staying in his
team’s locker room during the playing of the national anthem, but
he refused. 63 The NBA subsequently suspended him for one game
without pay, and thereafter Abdul-Rauf stood for the national anthem and prayed during its playing. 64
There are any number of instances of smaller player speech or
expression infractions that do not rise to the level of a national controversy but that, nevertheless, are addressed through discipline

57. See Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Comm’r of Major League Baseball, No.
104 (Nov. 30, 2000) (Manfred, Fehr & Das, Arbs.), in 1 UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS AND
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 767, 769 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Court Handbook
Series No. G-638, 2001).
58. Id. at 770.
59. Id. at 769.
60. Id. at 804–06.
61. Koenig, supra note 26, at 377–78.
62. McElroy, supra note 31.
63. Seifert, supra note 52.
64. Id.
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by professional sports leagues. 65 Some examples are illustrative.
In 2014, Colin Kaepernick was fined $10,000 for wearing Beats by
Dre headphones in the locker room, a violation of NFL rules forbidding players from wearing items with commercial names or
logos close to game time. 66 In 2009, NFL player Dunta Robinson
was fined $25,000 by his team, the Houston Texans, for writing a
message on his cleats urging management to give him a larger contract. 67 MLB suspended Yunel Escobar of the Toronto Blue Jays
for three games during the 2012 season for writing an anti-gay slur
on his eye black. 68 The NFL also disciplined Cam Heyward of the
Pittsburgh Steelers for writing “Iron Man” on his eye black. 69 Despite Heyward’s intent to honor his father’s battle with cancer, the
NFL still fined him for violating the NFL’s rule against personal
messages. 70 Finally, the NFL fined DeAngelo Williams of the Pittsburgh Steelers for wearing pink on his uniform for the entire season—as opposed to a designated month, as is NFL tradition—to
honor his mother, who died of breast cancer. 71
While these examples of league discipline may seem harsh, there
are a number of other circumstances where professional sports
leagues chose not to punish players for their speech or expression,
even when it was seemingly permissible to do so. For example, to
mark the tenth anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, the NFL allowed Lance Briggs and other players to wear
special patriotic athletic gear during a game. 72 In 2014, the NFL
chose not to discipline players who staged a “hands up, don’t shoot”
demonstration in honor of Michael Brown before a game. 73 Even
during the take-a-knee controversy, the NFL chose not to discipline players and, instead, expressed support for the players’ social

65. See McElroy, supra note 31. Professional sports leagues also have punished players
for not abiding by required media obligations. For example, the NFL fined Marshawn Lynch
of the Seattle Seahawks $75,000 for failing to make himself available to the media pursuant
to the league’s Media Access Policy. Id.
66. See Boudway, supra note 19.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. Jake Thorne, NFL vs. Freedom of Expression, MICH. REV. (Nov. 18, 2015), https://
www.michiganreview.com/the-nfl-vs-freedom-of-expression/.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Boudway, supra note 19.
73. Chavez, supra note 40. On the other hand, the NFL refused to permit members of
the Dallas Cowboys from wearing decals on their uniforms to honor Dallas police officers
that had been murdered. Id.
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protest. 74 Moreover, MLB decided not to punish Bruce Maxwell of
the Oakland Athletics when he kneeled during the national anthem in September of 2017 in solidarity with NFL players. 75
Indeed, these anecdotal examples seem to give credence to the
theory that professional sports leagues are more likely to discipline
in instances involving wearable items and insensitive speech, but
less likely to do so when players speak or otherwise express themselves on social issues. 76 This informal line of demarcation may be
due to some of the underlying racial dynamics in sports between
black players and (largely) white owners and decision makers.
V. THE COMPLICATED RACIAL DYNAMICS IN SPORTS
The take-a-knee movement in the NFL—and, to a lesser degree,
other professional sports—focuses on racial disparity in American
society. In particular, player protests have centered on the inequality that they believed African Americans face in the criminal justice system. Social protest by athletes is not uncommon, as the examples above demonstrate. 77 However, players’ beliefs about race
and the criminal justice system do not provide the entire context
for why so many players participated in the take-a-knee movement, and with such strong feelings and statements.
A major driving force behind the players’ social protest was a
similar racial dynamic in sports that they resented: that is, the
control exerted by owners and decision makers—almost all white—
over players, many of whom are black. Sports have a checkered
past with matters regarding race. At the same time, many view
sports as a key vehicle for helping change societal attitudes about
race—as Jackie Robinson breaking the color barrier in baseball
demonstrated. Moreover, it is understandable how, in what many
view as a post-racial society (and with the significant salaries that
74. Jacobson, supra note 20.
75. Jeremy Woo, Athletics’ Bruce Maxwell Becomes First MLB Player to Kneel for National Anthem, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 23, 2017), https://www.si.com/mlb/2017/09/23/
bruce-maxwell-national-anthem-protest-oakland-athletics; see Athletics’ Bruce Maxwell
First MLB Player to Kneel During National Anthem, ESPN (Sept. 24, 2017), http://www.es
pn.com/mlb/story/_/id/20796662/oakland-athletics-catcher-bruce-maxwell-kneels-nationalanthem.
76. See Chavez, supra note 40. In fact, after much internal discussion, the NFL owners
chose not to adopt a rule requiring players to stand for the national anthem. Ken Belson,
After Two Days of Talks, N.F.L. Owners Leave Anthem Rules Intact, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/sports/football/nfl-anthem-kneeling.html.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 14–27.
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professional athletes are paid), people may mistakenly believe that
those historically problematic racial dynamics play a lesser role in
sports today. The take-a-knee movement brought this simmering
racial dynamic back to the surface, though it is hardly the only example in recent years. These issues have been highlighted recently
in the growth of collegiate sports, as well as earlier this decade in
the NBA collective bargaining negotiations during the lockout in
2011. These examples help provide greater context for the players’
reactions in 2017.
College athletics—primarily through the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (“NCAA”)—is a multi-billion dollar industry. 78
However, very little of that money is passed on to student athletes.
In fact, two legal scholars described the high-revenue-producing
sports—football and men’s basketball—as “legal servitude” for
black athletes “for the profit and entertainment” of whites. 79 Nobel
Prize-winning economist Gary Becker described amateur athletics
as a regressive transfer of wealth from poor minority athletes to
those who profited off collegiate sports, who are largely white. 80
Even Walter Byers—the former executive director of the NCAA—
criticized the collegiate athletic system as having a “neo-plantation
mentality.” 81
To be sure, the NCAA does not intend to discriminate in its system of amateur athletics. 82 However, the impacts of this system
expose significant racial disparity. 83 African Americans make up a
disproportionate percentage of athletes in the sports that make the
NCAA, colleges, universities, and their corporate partners extraordinary amounts of money. 84 Those who benefit from the NCAA’s

78. Fair or Foul?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 27, 2013), https://www.economist.com/news/unit
ed-states/21576688-unpaid-student-athletes-are-heart-multi-billion-dollar-industry-fair-or
-foul.
79. Patrick Hruby, Four Years a Student-Athlete: The Racial Injustice of Big-Time College Sports, VICE (Apr. 4, 2016, 2:25 PM), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/ezexjp/fouryears-a-student-athlete-the-racial-injustice-of-big-time-college-sports; see Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, Major College Sports: A Modern Apartheid, 12 TEX. REV.
ENT. & SPORTS L. 13, 16 (2010).
80. Hruby, supra note 79.
81. Id. (citing WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE
ATHLETES 2–3 (1995)).
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
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system of amateur athletics are overwhelmingly white. 85 This economic contrast has led to lawsuits against the NCAA to pay college
athletes beyond tuition, housing, and modest amounts of money,
as the current system allows. 86 Understandably, student athletes
feel they are exploited by the NCAA and amateur athletics.
It is unsurprising that these dynamics flowed over into professional sports—especially those leagues in which the same college
athletes move on to play. The 2011 NBA lockout provides a prime
example. 87 Leading up to the lockout, several NBA decisions and
policies exacerbated the racial dynamics between an almost allwhite ownership and a predominantly black player base. For the
2005–2006 season, the NBA implemented a dress code for players,
justifying the move as needed to reflect a desired level of professionalism for the league. 88 Many reporters and scholars—and players as well—viewed the dress code as aimed at precluding players
from wearing clothes that black players preferred wearing. 89 One
player went as far as to state that the NBA policy targeted “part of
our culture,” 90 and another player claimed that the dress code was
“a racial statement.” 91 The players’ perception that the dress code
was implemented by white owners for a largely white fan base and
group of sponsors only served to flare racial tensions within the
league. 92
Two other controversies further heightened the tensions between the NBA players and owners leading up to the 2011 lockout.
First, the NBA restricted players from attending certain nightclubs, a policy adopted after some embarrassing incidents involving players at the establishments. 93 Players viewed this rule as paternalistic and involving racial overtones. 94 Second, the NBA
85. See id.
86. See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
87. See Matthew J. Parlow, Lessons from the NBA Lockout: Union Democracy, Public
Support, and the Folly of the National Basketball Players Association, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 1,
23–30 (2014).
88. Max N. Panoff, Note, Black, Tie Optional: How the NBA’s Dress Code Violates Title
VII, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 275, 278–79 (2009).
89. See id. at 282.
90. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895,
1904 (2007) (quoting Paul Pierce).
91. Id. (quoting Stephen Jackson).
92. See Mark R. Bandsuch, The NBA Dress Code and Other Fashion Faux Pas Under
Title VII, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 10, 19–20 (2009).
93. See Showalter, supra note 32, at 212.
94. Parlow, supra note 87, at 27.
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negotiated into the NBA’s 2005 CBA a minimum age requirement
for players entering the league: nineteen-years-old and one year
after high school graduation. 95 Players and scholars alike viewed
the minimum age limit as problematic because it disproportionately impacted black athletes. 96 These three conflicts set the stage
for some of the racial tension that erupted during the 2011 NBA
lockout and attendant collective bargaining negotiations.
In the summer of 2011, the NBA owners locked out players when
they failed to reach an agreement on a new CBA. 97 While there
were a number of areas of conflict between the two sides, the owners’ rigidity in seeking concessions on players’ pay, contract length,
and free agency led many players to feel that race played a role in
the negotiation’s dynamics. 98 In fact, prominent television journalist Bryant Gumbel equated NBA Commissioner David Stern to a
plantation overseer trying to exert power and control over black
players. 99 NBA star Dwyane Wade echoed this sentiment in snapping at Stern during negotiations telling him, “You’re not pointing
your finger at me. I’m not your child.” 100 With the race-related controversies leading up to the 2011 lockout, players reacted negatively to what some may view as traditional CBA bargaining
points. 101 Players saw the terms the owners sought as an attempt
to collectively gain greater power and control over players—gains
which generations of NBA players had fought hard to obtain. 102
The racial implications of these core terms of the CBA—and the
broader context within which they were sought—could not be overlooked.

95. NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement Ratified and Signed, NBA (July 30, 2005,
1:16 AM), www.nba.com/news/CBA_050730.html.
96. See Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of Banning High
School Players from the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 164 (2004).
97. See Parlow, supra note 87, at 1.
98. See id. at 23.
99. Id. at 24 (citing Kurt Helin, Bryant Gumbel Compares David Stern to “Plantation
Overseer,” NBC SPORTS (Oct. 19, 2011, 12:36 AM EDT), http://nba.nbcsports.com/2011/10/1
9/bryant-gumbel-compares-david-stern-to-%E2%80%9Cplantation-overseer%E2%80%9D/).
100. Kurt Helin, Report: Dwyane Wade Yelled at Stern During Labor Talks, NBC SPORTS
(Oct. 1, 2011, 4:08 AM EDT), http://nba.nbcsports.com/2011/10/01/report-dwyane-wade-yell
ed-at-stern-during-labor-talks/ (quoting Dwyane Wade).
101. See Parlow, supra note 87, at 29–30.
102. See id.
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CONCLUSION
The take-a-knee controversy in the NFL sparked a nationwide
normative conversation about what rights the players and league
should have regarding social protests involving the national anthem. But as this essay shows, the public’s perceptions of—or at
least its rhetoric regarding—the rights of each side were oftentimes disconnected from the realities of professional sports law.
While professional athletes do not necessarily have the free speech
protections afforded by the First Amendment, neither can professional sports leagues and teams unilaterally restrict players’
speech and expression. These parameters of player speech and expression—and the league’s ability to discipline players for such
speech or expression—is largely dependent on the terms of the
CBA negotiated in good faith by both sides. Professional sports
leagues vary in what their CBA and other governing documents
permit and restrict in terms of players’ speech and expression, and
therefore the general arguments heard during this public debate
were oftentimes over-inclusive.
These player protests also reminded observers of the ongoing racial tension between white owners and black players. These longstanding dynamics have ebbed and flowed over the years, but as
the NFL players’ response to President Trump’s incendiary comments demonstrated, they still play a prominent role in the players’ perceptions of their treatment by their respective leagues—despite player CBA gains over time. These issues persist because of
what many scholars and others see as an issue within the NCAA:
that is, black players in the two largest revenue-earning sports
helping make colleges, universities, and their corporate partners
high profits, but not truly sharing in those profits. Indeed, as the
NBA lockout in 2011 showed, even in professional sports leagues
where players earned tens of millions of dollars, the persisting racial dynamic of white owners having a significant degree of power
and control over predominantly black players leads to great tension and distrust between the two sides. Any resolution of these
issues—or at least progress being made along these lines—inevitably will need to come from the collective bargaining process and
perhaps the changing demographics of professional sports league
ownership and decision makers.

